We investigate whether politician gender influences policy outcomes in India. We focus upon antenatal and postnatal public health provision since the costs of poor services in this domain are disproportionately borne by women. Accounting for potential endogeneity of politician gender and the sample composition of births, we find that a one standard deviation increase in women's political representation results in a 1.5 percentage point reduction in neonatal mortality. Women politicians are more likely to build public health facilities and encourage antenatal care, institutional delivery and immunization. The results are topical given that a bill proposing quotas for women in state assemblies is currently pending in the Indian Parliament.
Introduction
This paper investigates whether women elected to state legislative assemblies are more effective than their male counterparts in providing public health services in India. It binds two streams of the literature, one concerned with political identity and the other with differences in preferences between the sexes. In the benchmark model of democracy, policy choices are independent of legislator identity (Downs 1957) but not in more recent citizen candidate models (Besley and Coate 1997 , Levitt 1996 , Osborne and Slivinski 1996 . Overlaid on the hypothesis that the gender of politicians influences policy and thereby social outcomes is the hypothesis that women have different preferences and so make different choices from men. Establishing the empirical relevance of these differences is key to informing debates over quotas for women in government, debates which refer to representation as much as to principles of fairness and diversity (Squires 1996) , but which suffer from a scarcity of causal evidence of the impact of representation on policy outcomes.
Preference differences between the sexes identified in numerous settings suggest that women are more likely than men to (i) invest in children and (ii) favour redistribution. 1 These findings suggest that women may be more likely to deliver public health improvements in developing countries where there are sharp positive age and income gradients in health and the essential policy challenge lies in addressing the early life health and survival of children in poor families. 2 Moreover, the benefits of interventions in this area flow differentially to women because they disproportionately bear the costs of weak reproductive and child health services.
Women carry the burden of high fertility and child mortality: they care for the sick, witness their children die, have further births, and risk dying in child birth. 3 In line with our hypothesis, the enfranchisement of women in early 20 th century America led to a sharp rise in state health expenditure and a steep drop in infant mortality (Miller 2008) . And, strikingly, results of the 1 On (i), see Thomas 1990 , Thomas and Welch 1991 , Hoddinott 1995 , Lundberg, Pollak and Wales 1997 , Case 1998 , Svaleryd 2002 , Besley and Case 2003 . One possible explanation of this is paternity uncertainty (Alexander 1974) . On (ii), see Besley and Case 2000 , Andreoni and Vesterlund 2001 , Edlund and Pande 2002 , Edlund, Haider and Pande 2005 , Warner and Steel 1999 , Washington 2008 , Oswald and Powdthavee 2010 . This has been linked to women being, on average, less likely to pay taxes and more likely to receive benefits (e.g. Alessina and La Ferrara 2005) . 2 Early childhood death accounts for 30% of all deaths in poor countries compared with 1% in richer countries (Cutler et al. 2007 ). There are vast inequalities in health within poor countries and most childhood deaths occur in poor households. 3 In the sample period, almost one in ten children died in India before the age of one. Structural estimates on data from the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh indicate that for every neonatal death (which we analyse here), women have an additional 0.37 births (Bhalotra and van Soest 2008) . Maternal mortality as a fraction of births is estimated at 0.5% (UNICEF).
British Election Survey of 2001 show that the single most important concern for men is low taxes while, for women, it is the quality of the National Health Service (Campbell 2004) . 4 Most of the available evidence pertains to the agency of women as mothers and voters.
But, even if women in society have different preferences from men it does not necessarily follow that female politicians will make different policy choices than male politicians. Under complete policy commitment, policy choices reflect voter preferences and not politician identity but recent models of democracy relax the assumption of complete policy commitment (Besley and Coate 1997, Osborne and Slivinski 1996) . Hence evidence of the relevance of leader gender in politics is informative of which of alternative characterisations of the democratic process is more accurate. There is as yet only a small literature that delivers causal estimates of the political agency of women (Duflo and Chattopadhyay 2004 , Rehavi 2007 , Beaman et al. 2009 , Svaleryd 2009 , Iyer et. al. 2011 , Deininger et al. 2011 , Clots-Figueras 2011 . We contribute to this literature in providing the first systematic analysis of the influence of women elected to state legislative assemblies on the provision and effectiveness of public health services for women and children.
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The failure of public health provision in developing countries is gaining increasing attention in the global arena (Black et al. 2003) and in India (DasGupta 2007) . Poverty is not a compelling explanation for the scale of (maternal and) child death given that most deaths can be averted by low cost interventions (Cutler et al. 2006) . The evidence points to political failure (Kiefer and Khemani 2003) but there is limited discussion of the potential significance of women's representation in improving the delivery of health services. This is topical given that the Women's Reservation Bill proposing that a third of seats in state assemblies and parliament be reserved for women is currently under debate. The Bill was introduced in September 1996 and passed by the Rajya Sabha (Upper House) in March 2010 but is pending in the Lok Sabha (Lower House). Political reservations for women were successfully introduced in local government as part of a decentralisation package reflected in the 73 rd Constitutional Amendment, effective 1993. This was a victory for India's women's movement, which emphasised the grassroots involvement of village women in village-level development programmes. The more limited support for the move to introduce reservations in state and national parliaments reflects, in part, a concern that women who claim those seats will tend to be 4 elite and therefore unlikely to represent the interests of the majority of women citizens ( (Mishra 2000 , Rai 2002 ). Here we effectively test the hypothesis that this implies their detachment from the interests of the common woman.
The available evidence of women's political agency in India (cited above) does not illuminate this question, as it largely pertains to women in village councils (Gram Panchayats).
Also, most of this evidence concerns women's headship, while we investigate incremental changes in women's political representation. In particular we investigate whether the district-level share of state assembly constituencies in which a woman is elected influences individual health outcomes and village public goods in the district. This is an importantly different question.
Women occupy a small share of seats in state assemblies and it is conceivable that incremental changes in their share will have limited policy influence even if their headship counts. Our focus on political representation in state assemblies is relevant since this is the level at which most decisions pertaining to public health provision were made until 1993 (Rao and Singh 1998) . Even after 1993, when powers over the implementation of developmental projects were devolved to the district and village level, state legislators continued to have substantial say and to play a potentially important role in negotiation with and coordination across layers of local government. In the empirical analysis we allow for a break in the coefficient of interest in 1993, and a further contribution of our work is that it provides evidence of the policy relevance of women's political representation for a longer period of India's democratic history, prior to 1993.
Since the reservation of a third of the headships of village councils within each state was randomised (by dictate), studies of politician gender in Indian panchayats have exploited quasi experimental data to identify causal effects. However, as the authors recognise, reservation may have direct effects on policy outcomes by changing the nature of political competition (Franceschet et al. 2009 ). The current project investigates the policy influence of competitively elected women. This leads us to different identification issues.
The main identification challenge is that the gender of a competitively elected leader is potentially endogenous. For instance, more progressive electorates may be more likely to elect women and, independently, more likely to invest in child health. A further potential problem is that the composition of births is endogenous to the political regime. We address these problems using a fixed effects instrumental variables estimator that exploits constituency-level information on close elections between men and women on the one hand and information on siblings in a large sample survey on the other (section 4). The estimation sample contains more than 70000 individual births to some 18000 mothers that occur across 246 districts (in 16 states) over the 32 year period, 1967-1998 matched to electoral data.
We find that a one standard deviation increase in women's political representation in the birth year (and similarly in the two years preceding birth) results in a 1.5 percentage point (24%) reduction in neonatal mortality, which is a 0.06 standard deviation change. These changes in neonatal mortality drive similarly large impacts on infant mortality. To put this effect size in perspective, consider that the causal impact of democratization on infant mortality in subSaharan Africa in the post-Cold War period is estimated to be a 1.2% point drop in infant mortality, which is 12% of the sample mean (Kudamatsu forthcoming).
These estimates stand up to a battery of robustness checks and we report several extensions. We also identify mechanisms consistent with politician gender exerting an impact on both the health infrastructure and the information and encouragement that recent studies suggest is important in determining the demand for public health services. Using village level data and instrumenting as before using close elections, we find that women politicians are more likely to invest in the village level public health infrastructure while men are more likely to invest in the financial (and telecommunications) infrastructure. However public health facilities in India are often poorly staffed (Das and Hammer 2007, Banerjee, Deaton and Duflo 2003) and uptake of publicly provided services such as immunization low (Banerjee et al. 2011 ). So we also investigated a range of indicators of the utilization of publicly provided health inputs, all of which have established impacts on childhood mortality risk. Using a smaller sample of more recent births and a similar identification strategy to that in the main analysis, we find that raising female political representation results in substantially improved probabilities of attending antenatal care, taking iron supplements during pregnancy, giving birth in a government facility as opposed to at home (note: we establish no change in the probability of giving birth in a private facility), early initiation of breastfeeding, and full immunization by the age of one. We argue that impacts on early breastfeeding and antenatal care, for instance, are consistent with politician-led information campaigns.
Overall, we establish the effectiveness of women politicians in delivering public health.
Our results reject the Downsian model in favour of more recent citizen-candidate models of political identity. They resonate with a diverse literature, different segments of which suggest that women exhibit a stronger propensity to invest in children and have more progressive social preferences.
Background: Women and Politics in India
India is the largest and oldest democracy in the developing world. It is a federal country in which the constitution devolves significant control over their own government to the 28 states and 7 union territories and population health in particular falls under the purview of State Districts are an important level of local government between state and village governments.
Women are severely under-represented in politics the world over and India is no different (section 3a). 6 Using data from two states and comparing villages with and without reserved headship for women, Duflo and Chattopadhyay (2004) and Beaman et al. (2007) find that the composition of public infrastructure at the village level is a function of the gender of the leader, with women being more likely to invest in drinking water and roads. Other studies identify impacts of women's village council headship on political participation (Beaman et al. 2007 , Deininger et al. 2011 ) and the willingness of women to report crimes against them (Iyer et al. 2011) . The only previous analysis of women in state assemblies in India is in ClotsFigueras (2011), Clots-Figueras (forthcoming) who establishes impacts on state budgets and urban primary education respectively using close election data. We motivate a substantive focus on health and complement close election data with sibling data to account for mother-level unobserved heterogeneity in preferences, which can affect the timing of births. In the wider international domain the only related study that we are aware of is Rehavi (2007) who also uses close election data and finds that state health expenditure in the United States is increasing in the share of women in state legislatures. Since state health expenditure has a bad press in developing countries Pritchett 1999, Filmer, Hammer and , we investigate indicators of public health provision that more directly measure the effectiveness of state intervention, and at a more local level. and 37 electoral constituencies and the median is 9.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
The mean of the proportion of seats in a district won by women is 3.6% (s.d. 7.4%). The median is zero and the 75 th and 90 th percentiles are, respectively, 5.5 and 14.3%. So the distribution is highly skewed ( Figure A1 in the Appendix). At least one woman was elected in 26.4% of district-electoral years and in this sub-sample, the share of seats held by women is 13.8%. There is an upward trend in the share of seats held by women ( Figure 1 ) and substantial differences in both the level and trend by state (Figure 2 ).
We define close elections as elections in which the winner and the runner-up are of opposite gender and the vote margin between them is less than 3.5%. Across the sample period, only 7.45% of district-years had at least one close election. They have become more common over time: Fewer than 1 in 400 seats had close elections between women and men in the 1960s and 1970s, but that figure jumped to more than 1 in 100 for the 1980s and 1990s.
Health Outcomes and Facilities:
Individual data on child survival are obtained from retrospective fertility histories reported in the second round of the Indian National Family
Health Survey (NFHS) by a representative sample of ever-married women aged 15-49 in 1998-99. 8 This makes it straightforward to identify siblings. The histories provide information on the year of birth and death for births that occur across three decades, so these data can be matched to the time variation in the political data. The data indicate the district of current residence and the years that the mother has lived in her current location. We drop mothers who had births in a location other than the current residence, but we investigate this restriction. 8 unconditional relationship is negative ( Figure A2 ). We now investigate whether a negative relationship persists after allowing for endogeneity and heterogeneity.
Empirical Specification

Identification
We are interested in the relationship between indicators of individual-level access to public health services and women's political representation at the district level. If common unobservables drive both electoral preferences for women and health-related behaviours then our estimates will be biased. To address this, we instrument the overall share of women politicians with the share of women who win in close elections against men, that is, elections in which the winner and the runner up are of opposite gender and the margin of victory is small.
The premise is that the identity (gender) of the leader is quasi-random in close elections between the sexes. To see this, note that in a first-past-the-post electoral system, the probability of being elected is a function of the vote difference between the winner and the runner-up and this function has a discontinuity at zero. As the vote difference approaches the discontinuity, constituencies in which a woman wins by a small vote margin are increasingly similar to constituencies in which a man wins by a small margin (Lee 2001 , Pettersson-Lidbom 2001 ).
Since we use not a binary outcome (man/woman) at the constituency level but the share of women at the district level, our specification is similar to a fuzzy regression discontinuity (e.g.
Angrist and Pischke 2008: chapter 6), but one in which we aggregate to the district level over discontinuities at the constituency level. We control for a polynomial in the constituency-specific margins of victory or defeat of each man-woman close election in the district.
Although the gender of the winner in a close election may be considered random, the existence of close elections between women and men may not, for example, it may depend on the number of female candidates in the district. To allow for this, we control for the fraction of seats in the district that had close elections between female and male candidates in the first and second stage of the instrumental variables procedure.
Since we focus upon newborns, a further potential source of bias arises from endogenous heterogeneity in the timing of fertility. systematically with the gender composition of politicians. This will tend to bias the parameter of interest and the direction of this bias is, a priori, unclear. We limit this problem by using mother fixed effects. These will of course purge all fixed mother-level unobservables including the timeinvariant component of their political preferences and any tendency they may have to compensate or reinforce state investments in children (crowding-out or crowding-in). This is a considerable improvement relative to using district fixed effects.
The first set of estimated models is
The subscripts denote the individual child i of mother m born in district d (in state s) in year t.
Mortality is an indicator for the index child dying by the age of one month (neonatal), women is the district-level share of state assembly constituencies to which a woman was elected in the year before the child was born and E is the parameter of interest. The other variables in equation (1), in order, are mother and cohort fixed effects, a third-order polynomial (F) in the victory margin (m) between the winner and the runner up for the man-woman election j, interacted with I jdt , an indicator for whether such an election exists, totalclose is the fraction of constituencies in the district that experienced a close election, X is a vector of child or mother-specific controls, Z is a vector of district-year varying controls and M are state-specific trends. Equation (2) represents the first stage of the IV procedure. It shows the potentially endogenous regressor, women, regressed upon the instrument, womenclose, and the same set of controls. The instrument is the fraction of constituencies in the district in which a woman won against a man in a close election.
The cohort dummies control for aggregate time-variation associated with, for example, secular improvements in health technology, episodic shocks like famines, floods and epidemics and any aggregate economic or political regime changes. The state specific trends allow for omitted trends that vary by state, for example, GDP or trends in the status of women. The district level controls Z include the shares of the population that are female, urban and low caste and male and female literacy rates. Controls X include dummies for the gender, birth order, rural/urban location, religion, and caste of the child and an indicator for whether the child is one of a multiple birth. We use a linear model since fixed effects probit estimates are inconsistent in short panels (Nickell 1982) and the relevant panel in this case is the micro-panel, where T is the number of children per mother. Standard errors are robust to arbitrary forms of heteroskedasticity and clustered at the district-level to allow for correlation at any time and across time within district (e.g. Bertrand et al. 2004 ). This also allows for correlation of the standard errors across siblings because, by construction, siblings are all in the same district.
In sum, the estimated specification delivers an estimate of the change in mortality risk across children of the same mother born at different times and so potentially under different political regimes, with the change in political regime constructed as a quasi-random assignment of the gender of politicians in the district of birth. We investigate the identifying assumptions that underlie the use of close elections. In view of our use of mother fixed effects, we check on the further identifying assumption that there are no omitted mother-specific trends the effects of which may load onto the variable of interest. We conduct a range of sensitivity checks including a placebo test and we explore the timing of effects and investigate heterogeneity in impact by individual characteristics and over time.
We then estimate equations that replace mortality in equation (1) with a vector of village public goods on the one hand and a vector of antenatal and early postnatal health inputs on the other. The identification strategies we use to analyse these further outcomes are similar and are detailed below, alongside the results.
Results
Survival Outcomes
Estimates of equations (1) and (2) Figure A1 ), we consider the survival improvements brought about by electing one additional woman. The median district has nine constituencies and so nine seats. As it happens, close to 10% of districts in the sample have exactly nine seats and in this set the mean (0.034) and median (0) share of seats held by women is very similar to the sample mean (0.036) and median (0). If one additional woman wins, the median number of seats goes from 0 to 1 and the share from 0 to 1/9=0.11. If we plug this in to the estimated equations, we get even larger numbers. The predicted decline in neonatal [infant] mortality is now 2.3 [2.1]%. We investigate this later (section 5.3) and find that the effects of politician gender on infant mortality are entirely determined by its effects on neonatal mortality. Table 2 shows how the estimates for neonatal mortality evolve as the specification is enriched to improve identification. The OLS coefficient is small and insignificant and there is no significant change in it when the sample is restricted to mothers with at least two births. The 2SLS coefficient without mother fixed effects is larger by a factor of eight and borders on significance. It rises by about one standard deviation and becomes statistically significant once we introduce mother fixed effects. Introducing the household and district level controls listed earlier makes no significant difference although the coefficient is slightly larger.
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The OLS coefficient is expected to be biased by the endogeneity of voter preferences (or self-selection of women into political candidacy). Our finding that it is biased downwards is consistent with women being more likely to be elected (or to come forward) in districts with poorer baseline health. Another possibility is that women who run in close races against men are positively selected on characteristics. The relationship between the local average identified off close races and the average effect depends on the underlying theoretical model, and our findings are consistent with a citizen candidate model. The cost of a close race is higher than of non-close races so a candidate needs a higher payoff to play, suggesting that only candidates with far apart preferences will play (e.g. Rehavi 2007 ). In general IV coefficients will be larger when the variable of interest is measured with error but we expect that measurement error in counting women winners in Indian elections is small. Indeed if measurement error were important then, as this is exacerbated by differencing, we would expect attenuation of the coefficient upon introduction of mother fixed effects. Instead the coefficient is larger still. This may indicate that parents reinforce endowments in allocations across siblings, consistent with other evidence that points in this same direction (Datar et al. 2007, Aizer and Cunha 2010) .
The first stage of the 2SLS estimates is reported in the lower panel of Table 2 . The instrument is powerful and the share of women who win across all elections moves proportionately to the share of women who win in close elections. With the share of women winners in close elections constant, the share of all women winners is negatively associated with the total share of close elections within a district since this now varies only with the share of male winners. We also report the reduced form of the equation system (1), (2) (see Table 3 , panel B column 6).
Robustness Checks
We subjected the baseline specification to a number of checks (Table 3) .
Specification of electoral variables:
Since regression discontinuity underlies the close election IV approach, we investigate parameterisation of the vote margin between the winner and runner up. The baseline specification uses a third order polynomial but the coefficient of interest is not sensitive to replacing this with a first or second order polynomial (columns 1-2). The premise that the gender of the leader is random in a close election only holds in a small window around the point where the vote margin between the winner and the runner up is zero, but there is an efficiency-robustness trade off in deciding the width of the window. We therefore investigate the chosen threshold for identification of close elections, varying this downwards and upwards from the selected 3.5% to include the range 2 to 4%. The coefficient on women is almost identical when we use a 2% margin, and it is insignificantly different for the other choices (columns 3-6).
We restricted the sample to district-year observations (41% of the baseline sample) in which there was at least one election between a man and a woman as these are the observations upon which identification rests, and we find this makes no significant difference (col. 7). To control for the possibility that certain political parties strategically appoint women candidates more than others (Rai 2002) , we condition upon the district share of seats occupied by each of seven parties. 11 We also control for the district share of state assembly seats reserved for low caste candidates to allow for the possibility that women and men compete differently for these seats.
These changes do not alter the coefficient of interest (column 8). Using the outer fence of the interquartile range, we removed outliers in women's representation above the 75 th percentile.
This amounts to removing the 1.45% of observations with women greater than 28%, and it corresponds to the visually evident outliers in Figure A2 . The estimates are little changed (column 9).
Within-mother trends:
In a model with mother fixed effects, identification of calendar time effects can only come from mothers having children at different moments in time but there is necessarily a trend in birth order and the mother's age at birth between siblings. This makes it important to isolate the effects of time-variation in women's political representation from the effects of birth-order and the age of the mother at each birth. We already control flexibly for birth order, using dummies for each order. We now introduce age at birth dummies and more flexible controls for mother's age at birth, namely, dummies for mother's cohort*child cohort (columns 1-2 of panel B, Table 3 ). This sort of nonparametric control allows for the functional relationship between survival and mother's age to have changed over time with improvements in the survival technology.
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Unobserved trends: We further investigated strengthening controls for unobservable trends in general. We extend the baseline specification to include state-specific quadratic trends, state*year dummies and district*mother's cohort dummies (columns 3-5, panel B). The last is important because a potential problem with using only district fixed effects is that different cohorts of mothers in different districts, having been exposed to different income and health conditions, are more or less likely to have children with lower survival chances. 13 To further mitigate concerns that we are capturing omitted trends, we implemented a placebo, modelling the neonatal mortality risk of cohorts born in t as a function of future politician gender (t+1 to t+9). These coefficients are all essentially zero (Table 4) 14 .
The estimates in Table 2 are on the sample of mothers that have had all their births in their current place of residence. This is a rather strong restriction. We relax it to include only children who were born in the current place of residence of the mother. In order to investigate the extent of any selectivity in migration, we also estimate the model with no restrictions. The coefficient of interest grows smaller as we successively lift restrictions on the sample but it remains significant and within two standard errors of the baseline coefficient (Table A8 in the Appendix). This puts aside any concern that our selection of a non-migrant mother sample is either creating a bias or producing results that may be altogether unrepresentative.
Close election data:
Following the initial use of the close election identification strategy in the context of close elections between Democrats and Republicans in the US (Lee 2001) , concerns have been raised that the outcomes of close elections may be biased in favour of incumbents or in favour of candidates from parties that have strategic control over the election process (Snyder 2005 , Caughey and Sekhon 2010 , Grimmer et al. 2011 . We investigate incumbency and party affiliation in addition to other observables but find no evidence of this in the case of close elections between men and women in India. A simple regression shows that the proportion of women in a district who won in a close election against a man is independent of the history of close elections in the district, the history of women being elected, the share of seats that each of eight parties contested in close elections and a host of district-time varying demographic variables (Table A1 ). Candidate and constituency characteristics are also independent of the gender of the winner in close elections. This includes the number of other female candidates in the constituency, whether the winner was the incumbent, the number of close elections in the past, the votes received by the winner and the total votes in the constituency (Table A2) . These results lend support to the identifying assumption that the gender of the winner in close elections between men and women is random.
Although district-specific unobservables are absorbed by mother fixed effects, we also show that districts that had a close election are matched on observables to districts that did not.
The observables include district demographics, the share of villages with hospitals and schools and the share of seats won by each gender in elections that were not close (Table A3) . Similarly, while we control in the regressions for the district-level vote-shares of each of eight parties, it is useful to observe that there are no systematic correlations between political party and the incidence of close elections (Table A4 ).
Extensions
Timing: The reported specification investigates the influence of the gender composition of politicians in the year before birth (let's call this t-1) since neonatal mortality is primarily determined by antenatal services and the health of the mother during pregnancy. We extend the model to allow for persistence in the impact of politician gender. Some persistence is built in by virtue of state elections typically taking place every five years. 15 We re-estimate the baseline model, allowing neonatal mortality to depend upon politicians in power as long as five years before birth (t-5). We find that politician gender in the two years before birth and in the birth year (t-2, t-1, t) has a similar sized significant impact but that the share of women in power more than two years before the index birth has no impact. (Table 4 ). This particular pattern of fading is consistent with, for instance, politicians targeting married women with information about antenatal behaviours. This is because the median duration between marriage and first birth in India is one to two years.
Timing, mechanisms and birth order: The evidence (below) suggests that women politicians enhance health facilities and disseminate information on healthy behaviours. Since both facilities and information are likely to persist within mother for the relatively short space of time between births (mean of about two years), we may expect exposure to women politicians to have its largest impact on the health of first births. This is indeed what we find (see the first two columns of We estimated the model for post-neonatal mortality and found no effects of politician gender (Table A6) . 16 However these estimates are biased by endogenous selection into postneonatal exposure to mortality risk because children only enter this sample if they have survived the neonatal period, and we have seen that neonatal survival is dependent upon politician gender.
Our observation of larger impacts of women's representation on neonatal than on post-neonatal mortality is also consistent with the tighter identification of neonatal mortality with state-level investments in women (maternal health and place of delivery). As children age into the post-neonatal period, they are exposed to a more diverse set of household-level influences including for example income, nutrition and aspects of parenting behaviour like hygiene. It is therefore harder to attribute improvements in post-neonatal health to public provision and this weakens politician incentives.
The probability that a child is born, and the sex of the child conditional upon birth may depend upon women's political representation. As we have the entire fertility history of each mother, we expanded the data so that for every woman there is an observation for every year in which she is exposed to the risk of birth (starting with her age at marriage and stopping at age 49 or the date of interview). There is no significant fertility response. However, the probability that a birth is female is increasing in the share of women politicians (Appendix Table A11) 17 .
Health Inputs
Village Public Goods
We now investigate how women's political representation influences tangible (and durable) supply-side investments. For this we use the under-exploited village facilities survey of the NFHS to look at rural infrastructure choices, similarly to Duflo and Chattopadhyay (2004) .
The estimation sample contains 1591 villages (in the 246 districts), 76% of which are surveyed in 1998 and the rest in 1997. So we do not have much time variation in these data but there is district variation. Facility is an indicator for a specified facility in village v in district d in year t.
Using year and district fixed effects and instrumenting for the district share of women as before, we estimate this linear equation system using 2SLS- We find that village public facilities are a significant function of the share of women politicians in the district in which the village lies (Table 6 ). The estimates are sharp and consistent across categories. A 10% increase in women raises the probability that the village has a primary health 17 A ready explanation of this would be that women politicians have been more committed to controlling female feticide. To test this hypothesis, we divided the sample at 1985, because ultrasound scanners started to be imported in 1987 and thereafter widely used for prenatal sex detection and it is only after the mid-80s that there is a significant trend departure of the sex ratio at birth from the biologically normal level (Bhalotra and Cochrane 2010). Our expectation was that we would see a positive impact of female political representation on the female-male ratio at birth after and only after 1985. However the post-85 coefficients are imprecise and we cannot reject the hypothesis that they are equal before and after 1985. We are therefore unable to nail down an explanation of this finding.
centre, a community health centre, a government dispensary and a government hospital by 0.22, 0.19, 0.18 and 0.057 respectively. With a view to identifying the sorts of village infrastructure that male politicians are more likely to provide, we ran the regressions reported in the lower panel of Table 6 . A 10% increase in the share of women politicians (which decreases the share of male politicians) significantly lowers the probability that the village has a bank. We also observe sizeable negative coefficients on indicators for post offices and telephone facilities, although these are poorly determined. In sum, the evidence suggests that women politicians are significantly more likely to invest in the public health infrastructure while men are more likely to invest in the financial and telecommunications infrastructure. This ties in with our initial hypothesis.
Individual Indicators of Antenatal and Postnatal Care
With a view to identifying policy-amenable inputs to neonatal mortality, we investigated a range of prenatal and early postnatal health-seeking behaviours.
18 These data are only available for births that occur in the four years preceding the survey date (1994/5-1998/9). There are siblings in this sample (for 15.3% of mothers) but they are characterised by short intervening birth intervals and given the evidence that a short preceding birth interval compromises the health of a child (e.g. Bhalotra and van Soest 2008), this is a selected sample. So, while we use the close elections instrument as before, instead of mother fixed effects, we use fixed effects for finely defined mother-groups, an approach similar to that taken in Kudamatsu (forthcoming). We construct around 1000 fixed effects for groups defined on a multidimensional space of mother traits, namely height (above/below mean), education (above/below primary), caste (SC, ST, OBC or high caste), urban/rural location and the birth year of the mother. The estimated equation system looks similar to (1) and (2), the only differences being in the dependent variable and in mother group fixed effects replacing straightforward mother fixed effects.
The results are in Table 7 and the mean and s.d. of each dependent variable is in Table 1 .
As in Table 2 , OLS estimates (not shown) are smaller than the IV estimates and tend to be insignificant. The table displays 2SLS estimates with and without the quasi-mother fixed effects.
Here we discuss the richer specification and present effects flowing from a 10 percentage point increase in women's representation (which, we explained above, is the approximate change in share associated with moving the number of women politicians elected in the median district from 0 to 1).
18 Since the samples we use for estimation of equations for survival and for health inputs are constrained to be different, we cannot conduct an accounting exercise measuring the contributions of the inputs to neonatal mortality but the association of the inputs we consider with neonatal mortality is widely documented.
Antenatal care, iron and tetanus:
The Indian government defines a complete course of antenatal care as including at least 3 antenatal visits, a 3-month supply of iron tablets and two tetanus injections. Only 37% of women in our sample achieve a complete course. We find that women's political representation increases the number of antenatal visits a woman makes by 0.28, which is 12% of the mean. It raises the probability that iron supplements are taken by about 10% points, relative to a mean of 57%. This is important given the high prevalence of anemia amongst Indian mothers (NFHS data) and the fact that it is a risk factor for low birth weight offspring and child survival (Bhalotra and Rawlings (2011) . The probability that a woman has at least one tetanus injection during pregnancy (which is important in lowering the risk of neonatal tetanus) is increasing in women but not significantly.
Breastfeeding: Women's political representation raises the probability of early breastfeeding by 13.4% points, which is a 28% increase. Although the vast majority of Indian women breastfeed and 77% of children are being breastfed at 20-23 months (UNICEF indicators), there are cultural inhibitions to breastfeeding immediately after birth and only 48%
of Indian women in our sample initiate breastfeeding in the first 24 hours. This is when the benefits of breastfeeding are greatest, lowering the risk of contracting infectious diseases such as diarrhoea and pneumonia and, thereby, lowering neonatal mortality risk (Jones et al. 2003 ).
Place of birth: Some 69% of births to Indian women in our sample occur at home, while the remaining 31% are distributed equally between public and private facilities. 19 Since home births are typically unattended by professionals, they generate neonatal survival risks that can be averted in the presence of birth attendants trained in the management of sepsis (septicaemia, meningitis, pneumonia); see Bang et al. (1999) .
We find that a 10% increase in women's political representation lowers home deliveries by 8.8% points. Moreover, there is evidence that this represents a shift of births into government hospitals: the same increase in women raises the probability of giving birth in a government facility by 11% points while there is no significant change in the probability of giving birth in a private facility. Contrast this with the impact of a 10% increase in state income: this similarly lowers home deliveries (by a more modest 1.1% points) but this arises entirely from a shift towards private sector deliveries; there is no change in the share of births in government hospitals (Bhalotra 2010). This suggests that putting women at the helm leads to improved access to government hospitals, consistent with the results in section 6.1. 
Immunization:
Conclusions
We investigated whether women politicians invest more in antenatal care and early child health because women incur the costs of reproduction and replacement fertility and they make greater investments in the early life health of their offspring. We identify significant causal impacts of women's political representation on neonatal survival, indicators of prenatal and early postnatal care, and the village level public health infrastructure. We control for voter (and mother) characteristics but are unable to control for politician characteristics. Therefore some part of the relationships that we identify may flow from women who win in close [political] races against men being positively selected.
As discussed, women's representation is a live issue in the Indian Parliament. On the wider international scale, quotas for women in government have been established in more than 100 countries in the last 15 years (Dahlerup and Francisco 2005) . Even if competitively elected women are positively selected, our findings are relevant to debates concerning political 20 Since immunizations are spread across the first year of life, the sample upon which the immunization equations are estimated is the sample of (surviving) births aged 12-24 months. 21 Access to publicly provided care is clearly relevant too since the next highest frequency, 16%, was recorded for it costing too much. Only 3.5% said it was too inconvenient or too far and 1.6% said it was because a health worker did not visit. 22 There may be complementarities in the outcomes we look at and between provision of facilities and information, for example, mothers who give birth in a facility rather than at home are more likely to receive information and encouragement to initiate breastfeeding soon after birth. 15 1970 1980 1990 2000 1970 1980 1990 2000 1970 1980 1990 2000 1970 1980 1990 2000 Observations 1826 *The first, second, etc. election refer to the number of constituencies within a district that have a man-woman election. So 40% of districts have at least one constituency (seat) that was won in a man-woman election, 13% of districts have at least two, and so on. **The vote margins are ordered by absolute value in districts with more than one election and now first, second, etc. margin refer to the first, second etc constituency. 
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Child's age when politician was in power See Notes to Table 2 . As in Table 2 , women is instrumented with womenclose. All regressions include the district controls included in Table 2 . The means of the dependent variables are in Table 1 . Table 2 . Using the specification in column 5 of Table 2 , column 1 runs the placebo on migration described in the text, effectively matching children to the "wrong" set of politicians. Column 2 removes the baseline restriction which resulted See Notes to Table 2 . Using the specification in column 5 of Table 2 , column 1 runs the placebo on migration described in the text, effectively matching children to the "wrong" set of politicians. Column 2 removes the baseline restriction which resulted in using only the sample of mothers who had never migrated. Column 3 uses the weaker restriction which is that we include only children who were born in their current place of residence-so we definitely have them correctly matched to politician gender but we exclude any siblings they may have for whom the match is uncertain. In column 4, we interact the variable of interest (women) with the caste of women politicians. See Notes to Table 2 . As discussed in the text, we expand the data to include for every mother a panel of every year at which she was at risk of birth. We then estimate the probability of continuing fertility (1 if birth, 0 if not, in each year, for each woman) in columns 1-4 and the probability that the birth is female conditional upon birth in columns 5-8. Since columns 1-4 suggest that there is no endogeneity in birth, the conditioning on birth in columns 5-8 is unlikely to create any significant selectivity. The four columns in each set of regressions parallel columns 2-5 in Table 2 in the specifications that they use. We instrument with close election outcomes as in the baseline specifications for mortality and inputs to health and survival. There is no evidence of politican gender impacting fertility. There is some evidence that politican gender impacts the sex of births, with the probability that the birth is female increasing in the share of female politicians in the district of birth. endogeneity in birth, the conditioning on birth in columns 5-8 is unlikely to create any significant selectivity. The four columns in each set of regressions parallel columns 2-5 in Table 2 in the specifications that they use. We instrument with close election outcomes as in the baseline specifications for mortality and inputs to health and survival. There is no evidence of politican gender impacting fertility. There is some evidence that politican gender impacts the sex of births, with the probability that the birth is female increasing in the share of female politicians in the district of birth. 
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